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1 Introduction
This paper derives and estimates optimal monetary policy rules in a setup where certainty
equivalence does not hold. In particular, our approach combines two different strands of the
literature on monetary policy rules that depart from the standard linear-quadratic framework
because either (i) central bank preferences are not quadratic, or (ii) the aggregate supply
relation is nonlinear.
As it is well known [see, for example, Svensson (1997) and Clarida et al. (1999, 2000)],
the combination of a quadratic loss function and a linear aggregate supply constraint leads
to a linear reaction function (or Taylor rule) by the central bank. The optimal policy rule
implies that the nominal short-term interest rate under the central bank’s control is a linear
function of the inflation and output gap deviations from their respective targets. Depending
on the backward or forward nature of wage and price setting, and on assumptions regarding
the information available to the central bank, both variables appear in the rule either in
current terms or as expectations of their future values. Because they provide a reasonably
good description of policy, linear rules have become a key element of diagnosis in the toolkit
of monetary-policy analysts.
Recently, there have been a number of studies that seek to extend this traditional setup.
The generalizations fall in two groups. First, Nobay and Peel (1998), Cukierman (1999),
Gerlach (1999), and Ruge-Murcia (2001, 2002) relax the assumption of a quadratic central
bank loss function and adopt instead asymmetric preference specifications. Their functional
forms allow different weights for positive and negative inflation and/or output deviations
from their target. Asymmetric preferences modify some of the results previously derived in
the linear-quadratic framework.
For example, Cukierman (1999) shows that when the central bank is more concerned
about under- than over-employment and there is uncertainty regarding future realizations
of inflation and unemployment, an inflation bias can arise even if the unemployment target
is the natural rate. Cukierman’s proposition is examined empirically by Ruge-Murcia using
cross-section data from OECD countries [Ruge-Murcia (2001)] and time series data from G-
7 countries [Ruge-Murcia (2002)] with encouraging results. Since the assumption that the
central bank aims at a lower unemployment rate than the natural rate has been challenged
on theoretical and institutional grounds [see Blinder (1998) and McCallum (1995, 1997)],
this avenue of research seems promising.
Second, Schaling (2000) and Dolado et al. (2001) study models where the aggregate
supply curve is not linear, but convex. In particular, the difference between realized and
expected inflation is a convex function of the output gap. The underlying idea behind
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this specification goes back to the traditional Keynesian assumption that nominal wages are
flexible upwards but rigid downwards, implying that inflation is a decreasing and convex
function of the unemployment rate. This implies that an increase in unemployment will
drive inflation down by much less when unemployment is high than when it is low [see Layard
et al. (1991), Clark and Laxton (2000), and A´lvarez-Lois (2001)]. If unemployment and
the output gap are related through Okun’s law, then a convex relationship between inflation
and the output gap is a natural generalization of the linear aggregate supply. Combined
with a quadratic loss function, the optimally-derived Taylor rule has nonlinear features: it
implies that the central bank will increase interest rates by a larger amount when inflation
is above target than it will reduce them when inflation is below target.
In line with the above discussion, the goal of this paper is to construct and estimate a
more general model that combines both asymmetric central bank preferences and a non-linear
Phillips curve. This is important for several reasons. First, it allows the joint analysis of
two departures from the linear-quadratic setup that until now have been studied separately
in the literature. Second, it permits us to trace back nonlinearities and asymmetries in the
nominal interest rate to either central bank preferences, nonlinearities in the supply curve,
or both. Finally, parameter estimates will indicate the relative importance of these two
elements in monetary policy making.
In order to make the analysis tractable, we make a number of simplifying assumptions.
These assumptions allow us to obtain an econometric specification of a Taylor rule where
departures from the usual linear-quadratic model can be identified. First, we take as starting
point the case of inflation targeting with no output-stabilization term appearing in the central
bank’s loss function. The reason for choosing this restricted specification is that it yields
a closed-form solution for the optimal policy rule, that is not possible to obtain when the
additional output goal is also considered. However, Svensson (1997) points out that allowing
for the latter term does not change the form of the policy function, although it reduces the
interest-rate response by the central bank to inflation and the output gap. Since our main
interest is in identifying departures from the standard reaction function and not in the size
of the coefficients themselves, we believe that the adopted assumption is not too restrictive
for the purpose at hand.
Second, we adopt a backward-looking specification of the IS and AS schedules in the
theoretical part [as Svensson (1997)], rather than a forward-looking specification as the one
proposed by Clarida et al. (1997, 1999, 2000). Again, the reason for adopting this formu-
lation of the aggregate baseline model is analytical tractability. The basic advantage of a
forward-looking specification is that it does not require the assumption that the central bank
is “over-ambitious” with respect to output in order to generate benefits from commitment
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[see Clarida et al. (1999)]. Since we do not tackle that issue directly in this paper, we
believe that the adopted specification is not too restrictive in this regard.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. From an analytical viewpoint, we construct
a model of inflation targeting where the central bank’s preferences are asymmetric and the
aggregate supply curve is nonlinear. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive
deviations from the inflation target can be weighted more (or less) severely than negative
deviations in the central bank’s loss function. The aggregate supply curve is an increasing
and convex function of the output gap. In this manner, we are able to derive a Taylor rule
in a nonlinear framework that generalizes the usual specification in the literature where the
objective function is quadratic and constraints are linear.
From an empirical viewpoint, we confront the new Taylor rule with data on short-term
interest rate interventions by the US Federal Reserve. Reduced-form estimates indicate
that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear rule after 1983, but not before
1979. Although we do not find evidence in favor of a convex aggregate supply curve, we do
find evidence consistent with asymmetric inflation preferences on the part of the US Federal
Reserve after 1983. This suggests that the Fed’s inflation preferences during the Volcker-
Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime. When
we compare our results with those of Clarida et al. (2000) using a linear Taylor rule for the
post-1982 period, we do not find evidence that the response of the short—term interest rate to
inflation was larger than unity once asymmetric preferences are allowed for. The reason for
this result is that under asymmetric preferences, the targeted interest rate depends on the
conditional variance of inflation, that in turn depends nonlinearly on lagged inflation. The
response of the interest rate to inflation depends on a linear part and a nonlinear part such
that the overall response is most likely stabilizing, as suggested by Clarida et al. However,
the interpretation of how stabilization was achieved in the Volcker-Greenspan era is different
in both models.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives the form of the nonlinear
policy rule under the general case of asymmetric preferences and a convex aggregate supply
curve, and compares it to several relevant subcases. Section 3 estimates the nonlinear rule
for the US, distinguishing between the two relevant subperiods and using a wide array of
alternative specification to check the robustness of the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
An Appendix contains a detailed derivation of the nonlinear monetary policy rule.
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2 A Simple Model
In order to fix ideas, it is helpful to consider a simple model of optimal monetary policy. The
model follows closely the one proposed by Svensson (1997), but generalizes the specification
of the central bank preferences and aggregate supply curve in a manner to be made precise
below. Although Section 3 reports estimates of the policy rule obtained using this model,
it also shows that the main finding of this paper is robust to the precise form of the rule (for
example, whether forward or backward looking).
Assume that monetary policy is conducted by a central bank that chooses the sequence
of short-term interest rates that minimizes the present discounted value of its loss function.
The loss function depends on the distance between realized inflation and its socially optimal
rate. Formally, the central bank’s problem is
Min Et
∞P
s=0
βsL(πt+s − π∗),
{it+s}∞s=0
(1)
where it is the nominal interest rate, 0 < β < 1 is the discount rate, πt is the inflation rate,
π∗ is socially-optimal inflation rate, and the loss function L(·) takes the form:
L(πt − π∗) =
exp(γ(πt − π∗))− γ(πt − π∗)− 1))
γ2 .
This loss function corresponds to the linex function, originally proposed by Varian (1974).
This function has several important properties. First, it permits different weights for posi-
tive and negative inflation deviations from π∗. Consider the case where γ > 0. For inflation
rates below π∗, the linear term becomes progressively more important as inflation decreases
and, consequently, the loss rises linearly. For inflation rates above π∗, it is the exponential
term that eventually dominates and the loss associated with a positive deviation rises expo-
nentially. Hence, positive deviations from π∗ are weighted more severely than negative ones
in the central banker’s loss function. Second, it predicts that both the size and sign of a
deviation affect the central banker’s loss. In contrast, under quadratic preferences, the loss
is completely determined by the size of the deviation. Third, it relaxes certainty equivalence
and allows a prudence motive on the part of the central banker. Then, moments of higher
order than the mean might play a role in the formulation of monetary policy. For this
loss function, the coefficient of relative prudence [see Kimball (1990)] is γ(πt − π∗), that is
directly proportional to the inflation deviation from its target and increasing in γ. Finally,
it nests the quadratic function commonly used in previous literature as a special case when
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the preference parameter γ tends to zero.1 This result is important because it suggests that
the hypothesis that the central banker’s preferences are quadratic over inflation could be
evaluated by testing whether γ is statistically different from zero.
The central bank takes as given the behavior of the private sector, that is summarized
by:
yt+1 = δyt − rt + ηxt, (2)
πt+1 = πt + f(yt) + ut+1, (3)
where
f(yt) = αyt/(1− αφyt), (4)
xt+1 = ψxt + et+1, (5)
it = rt + Etπt+1, (6)
yt is the output gap, rt is the real interest rate, xt is an exogenous variable that follows
the AR(1) process in (5), ut and et are normally and independently distributed shocks with
zero mean and variances σ2u and σ2e , respectively, and the remaining parameters satisfy 0 <
ψ, δ < 1, α > 0, and φ ≥ 0. Note that although we assume constant unconditional variances
for ut and et, we allow the possibility that these shocks are conditionally heteroskedastic.
Equation (2) is an IS relationship where the output gap depends on the lagged output gap,
the real interest rate, and the exogenous variable, xt. Equation (3) is a backward-looking AS
relationship where inflation depends on lagged inflation and output gap, the latter appearing
in a (possibly) non-linear way. The nonlinearity of the AS curve is represented using the
functional form (4). This form is more tractable than other specifications used in the
literature [see, for example, Nobay and Peel (2000)] and includes the cases of a linear AS
curve when φ = 0 and a convex one when φ > 0. Finally, equation (6) is the Fisher relation.
Although this model is a highly stylized description of the economy, it is representative of
the type of models used by the literature on monetary policy rules.
Since the interest rate affects inflation with a two-period lag, without any effects in t and
t + 1, the central bank can find the optimal interest rate at time t as the solution to the
simpler period-by-period problem [see Svensson (1997)]:
Min Et β2L(πt+2 − π∗).
{it} (7)
1Formally,
Lim
γ → 0
exp(γx)− γx− 1
γ2 =
Lim
γ → 0
x exp(γx)− x
2γ =
Lim
γ → 0
x2 exp(γx)
2
=
x2
2
.
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The Appendix shows that the first-order conditions for minimizing (7) subject to the con-
straints (2) and (3), yields the following Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate:
it = πt + f(yt) + δyt +
(1/α)(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2 + f(yt))
1− φ(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2 + f(yt))
+ ηxt, (8)
where σ2π,t = σ2u,t denotes the conditional variance of the inflation rate.
A key assumption of the model is that the central bank’s loss function excludes an output
stabilization term. The reason for this exclusion is analytical tractability. The Appendix
shows that when an output term is allowed for in the loss function, it is not possible to
obtain a closed-form solution for the central bank’s problem and, consequently, the Taylor
rule cannot be characterized analytically. Svensson (1997) shows that allowing an output
stabilization term in a linear model does not change the form of the policy function compared
with the case of pure inflation targeting, but the response of the interest rate target to
inflation and output gaps is more gradual.
The Taylor rule (8) is general in that it nests the cases where the central bank’s preferences
are quadratic (γ → 0), the AS schedule is linear (φ = 0), or both. The latter case corresponds
to the linear monetary policy rules examined by previous literature. In order to gain intuition
regarding this policy rule, the following sections examine three special cases contained in (8).
2.1 Case I: Linear Aggregate Supply Schedule (φ = 0)
When φ = 0, the function f(·) becomes f(yt) = αyt and the AS curve is linear. In this case
the only nonstandard feature of the model is the asymmetry in central bank preferences, and
the nonlinear Taylor rule simplifies to
it = πt + (1+ α+ δ)yt + (1/α)(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2) + ηxt. (9)
Under asymmetric preferences, the conditional variance of inflation, σ2π,t (along with the
inflation rate and the output gap) is one of the main determinants of the interest rate target.
Up to the extent that σ2π,t depends on lagged inflation and output (for example, as in ARCH-
type models), the Taylor rule is nonlinear on lagged inflation and output.
Consider the situation where γ > 0, meaning that the central bank weights more severely
positive than negative inflation deviations from its optimal rate. Since α > 0, an increase
in inflation volatility (as measured by σ2π,t), leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate,
even if the level of inflation and the output gap remain unchanged. The increase is directly
proportional to γ because the central bank’s prudence increases with γ.2 The increase is
2A comparable result can be found in the literature on precautionary savings. When the assumption of
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inversely proportional to α for the following reason: when α is large, the central bank needs
to increase the nominal and real interest rates by less because a given decrease in the output
gap leads to a proportionally larger decrease in inflation when the AS curve is steep.
2.2 Case II: Quadratic Loss Function (γ → 0)
When γ → 0, the central bank preferences become quadratic on inflation and there is no
longer a prudence motive in the implementation of monetary policy. However, if φ > 0, the
AS curve is convex and the Taylor rule takes the nonlinear form
it = πt + f(yt) + δyt +
(1/α)(πt − π∗ + f(yt))
1− φ(πt − π∗ + f(yt))
+ ηxt. (10)
In this case yt, will not appear in a linear way but through the f(·) transformation. As a
result of the second-to-last term in (10), the nominal interest rate will depend nonlinearly on
inflation and the output gap, but this nonlinearity is conceptually and functionally different
from the one in Case I above. It is shown below that when the AS curve is convex, interest
rate changes in response to inflation/output deviations from their target are subject to sign
and size asymmetries.
2.3 Case III: Linear Rule
The case where both γ → 0 and φ = 0 corresponds to the usual model with quadratic
preferences and linear constraints. In this case, the optimal reaction function is linear in
inflation and output:
it = πt + (1+ α+ δ)yt + (1/α)(πt − π∗) + ηxt. (11)
We will see below, in this case changes in the short-term nominal interest rate are symmet-
ric, proportional, and history-independent. Put differently, for linear models, the impulse-
response associated with a shock of size 1 (standard deviation) would be the mirror image
of the response to a shock of size −1, one-half the response of shock size 2, and independent
of the moment the shock is assumed to take place [see Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1993)
and Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996)].
quadratic utility is relaxed and labor-income risk in nondiversifiable, then uncertainty increases the expected
marginal utility of future consumption. To satisfy the Euler condition, prudent households decrease current
consumption compared to future consumption and increase their savings.
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2.4 Implications
As we have seen above, the combination of asymmetric central bank preferences and a
nonlinear AS curve has nontrivial implications for the interest-rate response to inflation and
output gap deviations from their desired values. This section explores in more detail some
of these implications and the interaction between the two main features of the model.
When the AS curve is linear, a marginal change in the current inflation rate leads the
central bank to change the nominal interest rate by ∂it/∂πt = 1 + 1/α. In this case, the
change in it is independent of the current output gap and inflation rate and is symmet-
ric, meaning that if inflation increases (decreases) by 1 percent, the nominal interest rate
increases (decreases) by 1+ 1/α percent.
In contrast, under the general Taylor rule (8) (where the AS curve is nonlinear), the
change in it is ∂it/∂πt = 1 + (1/α)(1 − φ(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2 + f(yt))−2. The nonlinear
interest rate rule gives rise to sign and size asymmetries. The sign asymmetry refers to
the fact that under the nonlinear Taylor rule, the response to an increase in inflation is
larger than the response to a decrease, even if both are of the same magnitude. As an
illustration, assume that inflation is exactly the optimal rate, the output gap is zero, and
α = 2, δ = 0.1,φ = 0.2 and γσ2π,t/2 = 0.4. Then, ∆πt = +1 induces ∆it = +1.76 but
∆πt = −1 induces ∆it = −1.48.
The size asymmetry refers to the fact that the interest rate response does not change
linearly with the change in the inflation rate. For example, taking the same parameter
values above, ∆πt = +1 induces ∆it = +1.76 but ∆πt = +2 induces ∆it = +4.09. Although
∆πt = +2 is twice ∆πt = +1, the interest rate response +4.09 is more than twice +1.76. On
the other hand, while ∆πt = −1 induces ∆it = −1.48, ∆πt = −2 induces ∆it = −2.82, that
is less than twice −1.48. The sign and size asymmetries that arise when the AS curve is
convex follow directly from the fact that the interest rate response with respect to inflation
(∂it/∂πt) is convex on the rate of inflation.
Note that when γ = 0 and, consequently, γσ2π,t/2 = 0, the corresponding interest rate
responses to ∆πt = +1 and −1 under the nonlinear Taylor rule would be ∆it = +1.63 and
−1.42, respectively, whereas for ∆πt = ±2 they would be ∆it = +3.67 and −2.71. Hence,
asymmetric preferences appear to reduce the size of both the sign and size asymmetries.
The reason is that the interest rate response to inflation is less convex on inflation as γσ2π,t/2
decreases.
Similar results regarding sign and size asymmetries arise when considering the interest
rate response to a change in the output gap. When the AS curve is linear, ∂it /∂yt = 1+α+δ,
but under the nonlinear Taylor rule, ∂it/∂yt = δ+f 0(yt)(1+(1−φ(πt−π∗+γσ2π,t/2+f(yt))−2)
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where f
0
(yt) = ∂f(yt)/∂yt = α(1 − αφyt)−2. The interest rate depends nonlinearly on the
current output gap giving rise to asymmetric responses on the part of the central bank. For
the parameter values above, the interest rate response to ∆yt = ±0.1 is ∆it = 0.35 and
−0.31. The response to ∆yt = ±0.2 is 0.74 and −0.59. Hence, as before, the response
depends on the sign of the output gap deviation from its target and is nonlinearly related to
the size of the deviation.
In summary, a convex AS curve leads an optimizing central bank to respond asymmet-
rically, in both sign and size, to changes in the output gap and inflation rate. Asymmetric
preferences leads to prudent behavior whereby the central bank responds to the conditional
variance of inflation. When the conditional variance of inflation is well approximated by an
ARCH-type process, the central bank responds nonlinearly to lagged inflation and output.
When both features are present, asymmetric preferences appear to reduce the sign and size
asymmetries that arise due to the nonlinearity of the supply curve. Since asymmetric pref-
erences and a nonlinear AS schedule lead to different types of nonlinearity in the interest rate
response by the central bank, it might be possible to assess empirically relative importance
of these two elements in monetary policy making.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 The Data
The nonlinear Taylor rule is estimated using US data on inflation, the output gap, and the
federal funds rate. Previous literature employs both monthly and quarterly data frequencies
to estimate monetary policy rules. We report results using both data frequencies and show
that the main result of the paper is robust to whether one uses monthly or quarterly data
in estimation. At the monthly frequency, inflation is measured by the annual percentage
change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Output is measured by the seasonally-adjusted
Industrial Production Index (IPI). The natural output level is the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
trend of the logged IPI. The output gap is then computed as the difference between the
logged IPI and its HP trend. We also consider a second measure of the output gap con-
structed as minus the difference between the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate and
its HP trend. The sample period is 1970:01 to 2000:12, but we focus on the subsamples
1970:01 to 1979:06 and 1983:01 to 2000:12. The first subsample corresponds (roughly) to
the chairmanships of Arthur Burns and William Miller. The second subsample corresponds
to the chairmanships of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, but excludes the period when
the Federal Reserve targeted nonborrowed reserves, rather than short-term interest rates.
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At the quarterly frequency, inflation is measured by the annualized quarterly percentage
change in the Implicit GDP Deflator. Two measures of the output gap are constructed as
explained above, except that the quarterly observation of the IPI and unemployment rate
is the arithmetic average of the three observations in each quarter. Since at the quarterly
frequency the number of observations in the first subsample 1970:I to 1979:II is too small
to yield reliable results, we follow Clarida et al. (2000) in starting the quarterly sample in
1960:I.
In the econometric analysis below, we assume that the model variables are stationary in
levels. Although unit-root test results do not always support this assumption for all variables
and frequencies, it is well known that unit-root tests have low power and are biased in favor
of the null when there are changes in regime as the ones documented by this paper.
3.2 Preliminary Analysis
The estimation of the non-linear Taylor-rule is carried out using a two-step procedure. First,
the conditional variance of inflation is estimated from the aggregate supply relation. Then,
σ2π,t is replaced in the Taylor rule and the rule is estimated by Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM). However, some issues need to be addressed prior to estimation. First, the
precise form of the non-linear Taylor rule depends on whether the aggregate supply relation
is linear or not. Recall that the AS curve is linear when φ = 0 and convex when φ > 0.
Hence, it is important to test whether φ is statistically different from zero in our data set.
Second, the prediction that the conditional variance of inflation is a component of the policy
rule can be examined in a time series setup only if inflation is conditionally heteroskedastic.
That is, if σ2π,t varies over time. Otherwise, if σ2π,t is constant, its coefficient might not be
identified. Hence, one must also test whether the conditional variance of inflation is indeed
time-varying.
In order to address these two issues, we estimate the aggregate supply relation (3) by
nonlinear least squares under the assumption that the disturbance term ut is conditionally
homoskedastic. We then test the null hypothesis φ = 0 using a t-test, and the null hypothesis
of no conditional heteroskedasticity using a LM test for neglected ARCH. The LM statistics
were calculated as the product of the number of observations and the uncentered R2 of
the OLS regression of the squared unemployment residual on a constant and six of its lags.
Under the null hypothesis of no conditional heteroskedasticity, the statistic is distributed chi-
square with as many degrees of freedom as the number of lagged squared residuals included
in the regression.
Results in Panels A and B of Table 1, support the notion of an upward sloping AS curve
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(as predicted by the theory), but results using quarterly data are somewhat weaker than the
ones using monthly data. This result might be explained by the fact that the econometrician
has more data points to estimate α when using monthly than quarterly data. In all cases the
hypothesis φ = 0 cannot be rejected at standard levels. Hence, for these sample periods and
data frequencies, it would appear that the US aggregate supply curve is well approximated
by a linear relation. Results of the LM tests for neglected ARCH are reported in the first
row of Table 2. Note that the hypothesis of no conditional heteroskedasticity is rejected for
both frequencies and output gap measures.
In light of these results, we estimate a linear (in mean) AS curve with conditionally
heteroskedastic errors. The parameter φ is constrained to be zero and the conditional
variance of inflation is parameterized using a GARCH(1,1) model. These results are reported
in Panel C of Table 1. The terms ψ0, ψ1, and ψ2 denote the constant, the coefficient of the
lagged square residual, and the coefficient of the lagged conditional variance, respectively.
Note that in all cases their estimates are significant and suggest a persistent process for σ2π,t.
Since the conditional variance is estimated using inflation and output data, σ2π,t is a
generated regressor for the second step of the estimation procedure. The implications of
generated regressors in estimation and inference have been examined by Pagan (1984) and
Pagan and Ullah (1988). Generated regressors can be problematic because they measure
with noise the true, but unobserved, regressor. In the case of models where a conditional
variance is one of the explanatory variables, estimates can be biased and inconsistent if the
ARCH-type model employed is misspecified. Pagan and Ullah (p. 99) suggest specification
tests to assess whether the chosen ARCH model is valid. A standard misspecification test
for ARCH models is the same LM test for neglected ARCH described above, but applied
to the standardized residuals. If the ARCH model is correctly specified, then the residuals
corrected for heteroskedasticity and squared should be serially uncorrelated. The second
row in Table 2 reports these LM statistics. Since all statistics are below the 5 percent critical
value of the appropriate distribution, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be
rejected. Hence, it would appear that the parsimonious GARCH(1,1) model employed here
adequately captures the conditional heteroskedasticity present in the US inflation data.
3.3 Estimation
As is customary in the empirical literature on monetary policy rules, the observed smoothing
of interest rates is captured by a partial adjustment model whereby lagged values of the
interest rate are also included as explanatory variables. The optimally determined interest
rate is interpreted as the desired rate towards which the current interest rate sluggishly
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adjusts. That is,
it = ρ(L)it−1 + (1− ρ)i∗t + ξt, (12)
where ρ(L) = ρ1 + ρ2L + · · · + ρn+1Ln, ρ ≡ ρ(1), and i∗t is given by the right hand side of
equation (9). Substituting (9) into (12), the estimated model is
it = a+ ρ(L)it−1 + (1− ρ)(byt + cπt + dσ2π,t + ηxt) + ξt, (13)
where a is an intercept term, b = 1+ 1/α, c = 1+ α+ δ, and d = γ/2α.
If the current values of inflation and the output gap are taken to be unknown by the
central bank when setting interest rates, then equation (13) can be estimated by Instrumental
Variables (IV), using lagged values of the variables as instruments. As an additional check on
the robustness of the results, we also estimate two forward-looking versions of (13) where the
current values of πt(yt) are replaced by expectations of future variables k(q) periods ahead,
Etπt+k and Etyt+q, and a backward-looking version where they are replaced by πt−1(yt−1).
The partial adjustment models were estimated byGeneralized Method of Moments (GMM).3
Denoting by zt a vector of m instruments, GMM exploits the set of orthogonality conditions
E(ξt|zt) = 0 to estimate the relevant parameters. The validity of the (m− p) overidentifica-
tion restrictions can be assessed through the J test that is asymptotically distributed as a
chi-square with (m− p) degrees of freedom.
The estimated nonlinear rules are reported in Tables 3 and 4, for the periods 1970:01
to 1979:06 and 1983:01 to 2000:12, respectively. The basic difference between both set of
results is that the coefficient on the conditional variance of inflation (d) is not statistically
significant in the first subsample, but it is always positive and significant in the second one.
This result is robust to both forward and backward-looking specifications of the Taylor rule
[see columns (3) to (5)]. Notice that in most cases for the second subsample, the rate of
inflation is no longer statistically significant once one introduces the conditional variance as
a regressor.4 In all cases, the overidentification restrictions of the model are not rejected by
the data at standard significant levels.
These findings suggest the following. First, monetary policy in the United States could
be well approximated by a linear Taylor rule prior to 1979. Second, the Fed’s inflation
preferences could be described as symmetric with respect to inflation in the period prior
1979. More precisely, the hypothesis that preferences are quadratic (γ = 0) would not
3In the case of forward-looking rules, we replace expectations of future variables by their realized values.
Then, by construction, the error term in the estimable form will be aMA(h) process with h =max{k, q}−1
implying that an optimal weighting matrix that allows for serial correlation ought to be used.
4Note that the conditional variance employed here is the one estimated using the full sample. However,
using estimates of σ2π,t for each subperiod yields qualitatively the same results as those reported.
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be rejected by the data against the alternative of asymmetric preferences (γ 6= 0). Third,
after 1983, a nonlinear Taylor rule seems to provide a more accurate characterization of US
monetary policy than a linear rule. In particular, the Federal Funds rate appears to react
more strongly to the volatility than to the level of inflation after 1983. Fourth, since the
coefficient on the conditional variance of inflation is positive and statistically significant after
1983, this suggest that the Fed’s inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan might
be asymmetric. In particular, positive deviations of inflation from its target appear to be
weighted more severely than negative ones, even if they are of the same magnitude.
3.4 Comparison with Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)
The results above parallel somewhat the evidence in Clarida et al. (2000), where it is
reported that the coefficient on inflation in a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule is
substantially different in the pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan eras. In order to make this
comparison more direct, consider results in Tables 5 and 6 that report the estimated rules
using quarterly data for the periods 1960:I to 1979:II and 1983:I to 2000:IV. As before, the
second sample excludes the period when the Federal Reserve targeted nonborrowed reserves,
rather than short-term interest rates. However, starting the second subsample in 1979:III
yields the same results as reported here.5
Column (1) in both tables illustrates Clarida et al.’s main result, namely that the reaction
with respect to inflation (c), is smaller than unity prior to 1979 but larger than unity during
the tenure of chairmen Volcker and Greenspan. This result is robust to the measure of the
output gap. However, note in Table 5 that this result does not hold completely once we
allow for asymmetric inflation preferences on the part of the central bank. Although results
are sensitive to the form of the rule, there are specifications for which the point estimate of
c is larger than one prior to 1979, though one would not be able to reject the null hypothesis
that the true value is less than one. For example, column (3) in Table 5 correspond to the
baseline model reported by Clarida et al. (p. 157) but includes the conditional variance
of inflation as one of the regressors. The point estimates of the inflation coefficient are
1.14(0.12) and 1.04(0.12) depending on the output gap measure employed. Also, notice
that in certain cases, the coefficient on σ2π is negative and statistically different from zero.
The intuition for this result is explained below.
Regarding the post-1982 data, Table 6 shows that the inflation response is considerably
smaller when we allow asymmetric preferences. For some specifications, cˆ is smaller than
5Results when the second subsample is 1979:III to 2000:IV are available from the corresponding author
upon request.
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one, though one would not be able to reject the null hypothesis that the true value is larger
than one. The reason for this result is straightforward: since the conditional variance of
inflation depends on lagged squared inflation, the inflation response consists of a linear part,
with coefficient c, and a nonlinear part, with coefficient d. The overall response with respect
to inflation is most likely stabilizing, as suggested by Clarida et al. The contribution of
Table 6 is to show that the nonlinear reaction to the conditional variance of inflation is a
quantitative and, in most cases, statistically important component of Fed’s reaction function
after 1982.
3.5 What Drives the Results?
In order to understand the empirical results reported in this paper, it is instructive to consider
the relation between the real interest rate and the conditional variance of inflation in both
subsamples. Although the policy rule is defined in terms of the nominal interest rate, one
can think of the central bank as implicitly targeting a measure of the real interest rate, that
in turn affects output through the IS curve. Figures 1 and 2 plot the relation between
the two variables at the quarterly frequency, and the fitted values of an OLS regression of
the real rate on σ2π. The estimated parameters of these regressions are reported in columns
(3) and (4) in Table 7. (Results using monthly data are reported in columns (1) and
(2).) Notice that in the first subsample, the real rate is negatively but mildly related to
the conditional variance. The coefficient is statistically different from zero, but given the
large variability of inflation during this period, the real interest rate response is considerably
muted. In contrast, in the second subsample, there is a strong positive relationship between
the two variables. The result is striking in that inflation is much less volatile in the second
than in the first subsample. The positive relation between the real interest rate and the
conditional variance of inflation is consistent with asymmetric inflation preferences because
this specification predicts a prudence motive in the implementation of monetary policy.
4 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal monetary policy rules by considering
setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences
are not quadratic and/or the aggregate supply schedule is convex. Under some simplifying
assumptions, albeit not restrictive ones, it is possible to derive a nonlinear Taylor rule incor-
porating both features. This rules is general in that it nests the cases where either feature
is present or where none is and, consequently, the monetary policy rule is linear.
[14]
In order to examine how relevant nonlinear monetary policy rules are in practice, we
estimate the rule using US data during the Burns-Miller (pre-1979) and Volcker-Greenspan
(post-1982) regimes at the US Federal Reserve. Although, there is no evidence against a
linear aggregate supply schedule in either regime, we find fairly robust evidence in favor of
the view that the central bank preferences are considerably different in both regimes. In
particular, the Fed’s inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime appear to
be asymmetric, in the sense that positive inflation deviations from its target are weighted
more heavily than negative ones, even if they are of the same magnitude. In contrast, it is
not possible to reject the null hypothesis of quadratic inflation preferences during the Burns-
Miller regime. Under asymmetric preferences, the fact that certainty equivalence does not
hold, means that a prudence motive can arise in the conduct of monetary policy and interest
rates respond not only to inflation changes but also to its variability.
A final interesting result of this paper is that, in contrast to Clarida et al. (2000) who
report that interest rate policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much
more sensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volcker period, we do not find
the response of interest rates to inflation to be larger than unity in the Volcker-Greenspan pe-
riod. However, once the additional effect stemming from the conditional variance of inflation
is considered, the rule in the Volcker-Greenspan era is found to be stabilizing as well.
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Table 1. Estimated Aggregate Supply Schedules
Monthly Data Quarterly Data
IPI (−)Unemp. IPI (−)Unemp.
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Linear
αˆ 0.06∗ 0.24∗ 0.05† 0.21†
(0.006) (0.03) (0.029) (0.13)
Panel B. Nonlinear with No ARCH
αˆ 0.06∗ 0.24∗ 0.04 0.06
(0.007) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)bφ 0.31 0.12 −0.79 47.92
(0.47) (0.59) (2.47) (37.87)
Panel C. Linear with GARCH(1,1)
αˆ 0.05∗ 0.22∗ 0.015 0.08
(0.006) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15)bφ 0 0 0 0
− − − −bψ0 0.005∗ 0.004∗ 0.07† 0.07†
(0.0025) (0.0019) (0.04) (0.04)bψ1 0.21∗ 0.17∗ 0.08† 0.08†
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)bψ2 0.75∗ 0.80∗ 0.87∗ 0.87∗
(0.06) 0.05 (0.06) (0.06)
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The superscripts ∗ and † denote the
rejection of the hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent
significance levels, respectively.
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Table 2. LM Test for Neglected ARCH
Monthly Data Quarterly Data
IPI (−)Unemp. IPI (−)Unemp.
Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4)
Original 34.54∗ 25.96∗ 15.72∗ 24.29∗
Standardized 4.50 3.34 9.83 9.93
Notes: The LM statistics were calculated as the product of the number of observations and
the uncentered R2 of the OLS regression of the squared unemployment residual on a constant
and six of its lags. The superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the null hypothesis of
conditional homoskedasticity at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table 3. Estimated Reaction Functions
Monthly Data
Pre-Volcker
Nonlinear
Forward (q, k)
Linear Baseline (3, 6) (6, 6) Backward
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Using IPI Gap
aˆ −0.10 0.38∗ 0.39∗ 0.32∗ 0.36∗
(0.33) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.17)
bˆ 0.57† 0.49∗ 0.08 0.12† 0.43∗
(0.31) (0.13) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10)
cˆ 0.84∗ 0.38† 0.73∗ 0.80∗ 0.40†
(0.31) (0.22) (0.07) (0.09) (0.23)
dˆ 0 4.27 −5.19 −5.94 4.52
− (6.81) (3.57) (4.31) (7.41)
J statistic 4.98 6.76 6.20 7.15 7.14
d.f. 8 13 13 13 13
Panel B. Using (minus) Unemployment Gap
aˆ 0.34 0.71∗ 0.78∗ 0.80∗ 0.27
(0.28) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22)
bˆ 1.93∗ 4.33∗ 0.29∗ 0.37∗ 2.04∗
(0.50) (1.30) (0.14) (0.17) (0.33)
cˆ 0.75∗ 0.10 0.70∗ 0.70∗ 0.72∗
(0.13) (0.29) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
dˆ − 3.03 −3.35 −3.93† 4.02
(4.92) (2.05) (2.05) (5.09)
J statistic 7.02 6.43 6.63 6.17 7.93
d.f. 8 13 13 13 13
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The instruments are a constant and
six lags of the variables in the estimated rule. d.f. stands for degrees of freedom. The
superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at
the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
[18]
Table 4. Estimated Reaction Functions
Monthly Data
Volcker-Greenspan
Nonlinear
Forward (q, k)
Linear Baseline (3, 6) (6, 6) Backward
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Using IPI Gap
aˆ 0.50∗ 0.38∗ 0.28∗ 0.08 0.26∗
(0.23) (0.15) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12)
bˆ 0.40† 0.88∗ 1.98∗ 0.65 0.90∗
(0.23) (0.29) (0.81) (1.02) (0.35)
cˆ 0.89∗ 0.73∗ −0.02 0.46 0.55
(0.19) (0.26) (0.59) (0.66) (0.37)
dˆ 0 10.17∗ 21.05∗ 29.10† 17.87∗
− (3.00) (7.34) (15.07) (6.21)
J statistic 6.00 10.76 10.17 12.67 11.69
d.f. 8 13 13 13 13
Panel B. Using (minus) Unemployment Gap
aˆ 0.52∗ 0.13† 0.15† 0.13 0.15†
(0.23) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
bˆ 2.75∗ 4.06∗ 4.52∗ 6.74∗ 3.40∗
(1.38) (1.97) (2.16) (3.24) (1.45)
cˆ 0.74∗ 0.43 0.72 0.59 0.57
(0.24) (0.46) (0.46) (0.52) (0.36)
dˆ − 17.38∗ 17.85∗ 22.41∗ 16.86∗
(7.10) (7.10) (9.74) (6.07)
J statistic 7.05 9.87 10.20 9.43 9.90
d.f. 8 13 13 13 13
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The instruments are a constant and
six lags of the variables in the estimated rule. d.f. stands for degrees of freedom. The
superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at
the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Estimated Reaction Functions
Quarterly Data
Pre-Volcker
Nonlinear
Forward (q, k)
Linear Baseline (1, 1) (1, 2) Backward
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Using IPI Gap
aˆ 0.58∗ 0.43 0.99∗ 1.00∗ 0.72∗
(0.15) (0.29) (0.24) (0.27) (0.22)
bˆ 1.07 2.97 0.31∗ 0.29† 0.94∗
(0.66) (6.56) (0.11) (0.16) (0.30)
cˆ 0.49† −0.77 1.14∗ 1.21∗ 0.36
(0.28) (4.49) (0.12) (0.20) (0.27)
dˆ − 1.41 −1.46∗ −1.87∗ 0.59
(5.99) (0.43) (0.73) (0.74)
J statistic 6.59 8.31 4.09 5.51 7.22
d.f. 4 7 7 7 7
Panel B. Using (minus) Unemployment Gap
aˆ 0.68∗ 0.73∗ −0.99∗ 1.08∗ 0.87∗
(0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.27) (0.26)
bˆ 3.21∗ 3.82∗ 1.55∗ 1.57∗ 3.52∗
(0.91) (1.48) (0.43) (0.77) (0.65)
cˆ 0.71∗ 0.63∗ 1.04∗ 1.14∗ 0.46∗
(0.11) (0.26) (0.12) (0.20) (0.15)
dˆ − 0.05 −1.04∗ −1.59∗ 0.64
(0.57) (0.39) (0.66) (0.48)
J statistic 7.03 6.96 4.60 4.56 6.26
d.f. 4 7 7 7 7
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The instruments are a constant and
four lags of the variables in the estimated rule. d.f. stands for degrees of freedom. The
superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at
the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Estimated Reaction Functions
Quarterly Data
Volcker-Greenspan
Nonlinear
Forward (q, k)
Linear Baseline (1, 1) (1, 2) Backward
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Using IPI Gap
aˆ −0.12 −0.99† −0.96∗ −0.78† 0.62†
(0.20) (0.56) (0.44) (0.40) (0.33)
bˆ 0.76† 0.51∗ 0.72∗ 1.03∗ 0.51∗
(0.44) (0.11) (0.19) (0.24) (0.15)
cˆ 2.96∗ 1.18∗ 1.22∗ 0.90∗ 0.73∗
(0.75) (0.23) (0.27) (0.39) (0.23)
dˆ − 5.44∗ 5.43∗ 6.25∗ 1.00
(1.13) (1.53) (2.06) (2.20)
J statistic 5.72 3.89 5.05 8.22 8.91
d.f. 4 7 7 7 7
Panel B. Using (minus) Unemployment Gap
aˆ −0.19∗ −0.44 −0.87 −1.42∗ 0.36
(0.26) (0.39) (0.63 (0.55) (0.33)
bˆ 2.36† 2.91∗ 2.86∗ 2.74∗ 2.17∗
(1.37) (0.76) (0.80) (0.66) (0.58)
cˆ 3.08∗ 1.14∗ 0.89∗ 1.03† 0.37
(0.76) (0.35) (0.22) (0.52) (0.28)
dˆ − 4.81∗ 5.39∗ 6.88∗ 3.18
(1.57) (1.13) (2.05) (2.19)
J statistic 4.35 5.82 4.20 7.78 8.87
d.f. 4 7 7 7 7
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The instruments are a constant and
four lags of the variables in the estimated rule. d.f. stands for degrees of freedom. The
superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at
the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table 7. Results OLS Regression
Monthly Data Quarterly Data
Pre-Volcker Volcker-Greenspan Pre-Volcker Volcker-Greenspan
Coefficient on (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.63∗ 2.62∗ 2.32∗ −0.58
(0.30) (0.19) (0.33) (1.13)
σ2π −3.83 7.03∗ −0.94∗ 4.15∗
(2.34) (1.92) (0.17) (1.06)
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The superscripts ∗ and † denote the
rejection of the hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent
significance levels, respectively.
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A Appendix
This Appendix derives the optimal monetary policy rule when preferences are asymmetric
and the supply curve is nonlinear. The central bank is assumed to implement monetary
policy using the nominal interest rate as instrument. The dynamic problem of the central
bank [see eq. (1) in text] can be decomposed into the sequence of period-by-period problems:
Min Etβ2L(πt+2 − π∗),
{it}
subject to
yt+1 = δyt − rt + ηxt,
πt+1 = πt + f(yt) + ut+1,
where f(yt) = αyt/(1− αφyt), xt+1 = ψxt + et+1, and it = rt + Etπt+1, with all notation as
defined in the text. In order to derive the first-order condition, apply the chain rule:
Et((∂Lt+2/∂πt+2)(∂πt+2/∂yt+1)(∂yt+1/∂rt)(∂rt/∂it)) = 0,
−α(exp(γEt(πt+2 − π∗) + (γ2/2)σ2π,t)− 1)/(γ(1− αφyt+1)2) = 0.
This condition is satisfied if and only if:
Etπt+2 = π∗ − γσ2π,t/2.
But, from the aggregate supply relation
Etπt+2 = Et(πt+1 + f(yt+1) + ut+2),
= Et(πt + f(yt) + f(yt+1) + ut+2 + ut+1),
= πt + αyt/(1− αφyt) + α(δyt − rt + ηxt)/(1− αφ(δyt − rt)).
Hence, it must be the case that
πt+2 − γσ2π,t/2 = πt + αyt/(1− αφyt) + α(δyt − rt + ηxt)/(1− αφ(δyt − rt)). (14)
Solving for rt :
rt = δyt +
(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2 + f(yt))
α(1− φ(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2 + f(yt)))
+ ηxt. (15)
Substituting into the Fisher equation, using Etπt+1 = πt + f(yt), and simplifying:
it = πt + f(yt) + δyt +
(1/α)(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2 + f(yt))
1− φ(πt − π∗ + γσ2π,t/2 + f(yt))
+ ηxt,
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that corresponds to expression (8) reported in the text.
If a quadratic output-stabilization term were to be added to the central bank’s loss
function, the new function would be
L(πt − π∗, yt) =
exp(γ(πt − π∗))− γ(πt − π∗)− 1))
γ2 + λy
2
t ,
where λ > 0 measures the importance of output stabilization. The minimization of this
function subject to the same set of constraints is discussed in detail in Svensson (1997).
Svensson (see Appendix B) proposes to study first the simpler problem represented by the
Bellman equation.
V (πt) =
min
{yt}
(
exp(γ(πt − π∗))− γ(πt − π∗)− 1))
γ2 + λy
2
t + βEtV (πt+1)
)
,
subject to πt+1 = πt + f(yt) + ut+1, where the output gap is the control variable and, for
simplicity, we will assume that φ = 0, meaning f(yt) = αyt. When γ → 0, the value function
will be quadratic: V (πt) = k0 + k1(πt − π∗)2. The coefficient k1 can be found analytically
using the envelope theorem. When γ 6= 0, the value function will have the linex form:
V (πt) = k0 + k1
exp(γ(πt − π∗))− γ(πt − π∗)− 1
γ2 .
The envelop theorem implies
Vπ(πt) = k1
exp(γ(πt − π∗))− 1
γ ,
EtVπ(πt+1) = k1
exp(γ(Etπt+1 − π∗) + γ2σ2π,t/2)− 1
γ .
It is not hard to verify that a closed-form expression for k1 does not exist. Consequently, a
closed-form expression for the policy rule does not exist either.
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